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The emphasis of this paper is on the political economy of the subprime mortgage 
crisis in the United States and how the policy makers contributed to it through 
their legislation and regulations, made under the rising inﬂ   uence of interest 
groups and the lobbying activities of the ﬁ  nance industry. The “Great Recession” 
of 2007-2009 began as a bubble-burst in the mortgage market in the United States 
that spilled over to the entire ﬁ  nancial market of the US, and afterwards to the 
integrated world ﬁ  nancial market. The crisis sprang up over the US real sector 
and, due to the decline in US aggregate demand, spread consequently to the real 
economy of the rest of the World. No sound evidence has been given for the publi-
cly proclaimed idea that the causes of the crisis lie within the self-regulating free 
market. The causes of the crisis lie primarily in the activities of political power, 
i.e. in the extensive government regulation which has, under the strong inﬂ  uence 
of interest groups and the lobbying power of ﬁ  nancial corporations, led to favou-
ritism in macroeconomic policies and inefﬁ  cient resource allocation. Regulation 
was enforced by stimulating affordable housing through government sponsored 
enterprises, oligopoly of the rating agencies, banking regulation and an increa-
sing connection between government and the ﬁ  nance industry. 
Keywords: United States ﬁ  nancial crisis, political economy, government regula-
tion, lobbying, political power
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since September 2008 the main emphasis of the public, the business world, poli-
ticians and economists has been on the global ﬁ  nancial crisis1. This crisis by now 
called the “Great Recession” due to its strong and long-lasting effects resulted in 
social and political instability in various parts of the world. Claims were made that 
it would outmatch the Great Depression of the 1930s in its profound and lasting 
consequences. Governments throughout the world are using the panic as an excuse 
to increase their relative size in the economy and strengthen their regulatory power 
and the interventionist redistribution of income. Inﬂ  uential economic analysts, 
populist politicians and anti-globalists are warning of the failure of the free market 
system, the end of the “neoliberal” economy and are calling for the end of globa-
lization while contributing to the rising protectionism. 
This paper will question the notion that the causes of the crisis lie within increa-
sing deregulation and an unconstrained free market. Through analyzing the causes 
of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis the paper will focus on the political economy of the 
crisis seen through the increasing impact of lobbyists and interest groups on poli-
tical and regulatory decisions. It is not a question of for or against intervention; it 
1 According to NBER the crisis in the US started in December 2007 and finished in June 2009, but with ban-
kruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the rising danger of further bank crashes the crisis culminated and became 



















































































































93 is a matter of political decisions that caused a distortion of the market that led to 
accumulation of systemic risk. 
The reasons of banks’ risky behaviour do not lie in the deregulation of the banking 
sector, rather they originate from overregulation and the artiﬁ  cially created de-
mand for housing and mortgages created by those same politicians who now seek 
for answers to why and how the system got so corrupt and risk-laden. The free and 
efﬁ  cient market is being constrained by regulations aimed at punishing those who 
made inefﬁ  cient and risky decisions. The central government regulators induced 
the policies of affordable housing and mortgage investments. Extensive debt ac-
cumulation and risk-taking combined with house inﬂ  ation upon which the growth 
of the ﬁ  nancial sector was fuelled were all consequences of government policies. 
The banks and other ﬁ  nancial institutions caught up in the downward spiral were 
only following the decisions the government regulations were guiding them into. 
The main argument of this paper revolves around that point. The desire of regula-
tors to eliminate risk from the system by determining what kind of decisions busi-
nesses should make or by guiding their investment incentives led to the creation 
of a high level of systemic risk that became inherent to the society. 
The paper begins by introducing an international perspective on the current crisis. 
It focuses around the United States in particular because of its central role in the 
inception of the crisis which spilled over onto the rest of the world’s ﬁ  nancial 
markets and so bringing about the worldwide recession. Subsequently it endea-
vours to explain opposing views about the causes of the crisis. It continues with a 
description of the mechanism of adjustable rate mortgages and offers a perspective 
on increasing bank risk-taking, the burst of the housing bubble and the spill-over 
effect to the real sector of the economy. In chapter four the paper examines the 
political and regulatory inducements of the crisis. It covers the impact each of them 
had on the economy and possible reasons why the policymakers instituted them. 
These causes include the general regulatory enhancement of systemic risk by the 
policymakers with the unintended consequences on the bolstering of the crisis, the 
role of government-sponsored enterprises and the legislative solutions in housing 
policies as well as the function of rating agencies and intensiﬁ  ed banking regula-
tion. An assessment on whether monetary policy had implications in creating the 
crisis and the housing bubble is given in chapter ﬁ  ve with help of the Taylor rule. 
Finally the role of the rising inﬂ  uence of the political power of the ﬁ  nancial indu-
stry as possibly the decisive factor of the crisis is portrayed in chapter six. 
2 INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE CRISIS
The international environment preceding the crisis was characterized by globally 
stable economic growth, growth of productivity and a low level of inﬂ  ation – which 
was a primary result of policy changes by central banks focused on inﬂ  ation tar-



















































































































94 worldwide (ﬁ  gure 1 and 2). Due to the recession in 2001 the US Federal Reserve 
Board (Fed) introduced a sharp decrease in its target interest rate. Even though 
this resulted in the recovery of the economy, ﬁ  gures remained weak, not showing 
signs did not of a substantial GDP growth or growth of employment, at least until 
2005. In addition to this “jobless recovery” there were threats of a decrease in in-
ﬂ  ation, which was already at very low levels (ﬁ  gure 3) and a serious concern that 
the US might experience a recession decade, like that endured in Japan in the 90s. 
Even after tightening of the monetary policy in 2004 real rates still remained ra-
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FIGURE 3
Historically low inﬂ  ation rates worldwide, 
average inﬂ  ation, annual % change 
FIGURE 4
Current account balances as shares of 
World GDP
FIGURE 2
Real short-term interest rates (%)
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Source: IMF (2010). 
The European Central Bank (ECB) was less aggressive than the Fed due to the 
fact that ECB has to deal with differing inﬂ  ation rates among its member countries 
whereas the Fed does not. The ECB monetary policy rate generated different 



















































































































95 policy rates, such as Ireland or Spain, experienced housing booms, while coun-
tries with low inﬂ  ation and higher real policy rates such as Germany, did not 
experience an asset price bubble.2 An empirical investigation of monetary policy 
as a possible cause of the crisis will be addressed later in chapter ﬁ  ve. 
Low real interest rates reﬂ  ected high world savings. There was strong demand for 
safe assets from Asian and oil exporting countries that contributed to depress the 
yield on long term government securities issued by advanced economies, the US 
in particular. A low US savings rate also contributed in steering assets from cur-
rent account surplus countries into ﬁ  nancing US investments and consumption. 
However, capital inﬂ  ows were used to ﬁ  nance current consumption rather than 
investment into productive assets. The US current account deﬁ  cit started to grow 
uncontrollably by the end of 1998 and reached its highest level around 2006, whi-
le at the same time oil exporting countries and emerging Asian countries experie-
nced high surpluses in their current accounts (ﬁ  gure 4). This period is matched by 
the likewise high growth in the US housing market. There is no proof that the 
current account deﬁ  cit itself caused the housing boom, but there is evidence that 
the inﬂ  ow of foreign capital was mainly used at the time being for the purchase of 
real-estate, adding to the housing bubble3. Excess savings in Asia were being in-
vested into safe assets such as US government securities, which contributed to a 
high level of capital inﬂ  ows into the US. High inﬂ  ows into the US brought about 
excessive risk taking and exposed domestic ﬁ  nancial institutions, companies and 
households to exchange rate risk. Pushing excess savings towards assets increases 
the demand for these assets which resulted in an appreciation of asset prices. This 
put additional pressure on demand as well as on total output. An inﬂ  ow of foreign 
savings, combined with low interest rates and expectations of constantly increa-
sing asset prices resulted in the creation of an asset bubble in both houses and 
  securities. An increasing demand for assets motivated the ﬁ  nancial market in de-
veloping new instruments and securities (derivatives) whose main purpose was to 
diversify risks. 
3 ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS ON THE HOUSING AND FINANCIAL MARKET
There have been many disagreements as to the causes of the Great Recession. 
Opposing views have been deﬁ  ned in two main categories; one, the (New) Key-
nesian, which states that the crisis is to be blamed on deregulation and proﬁ  t 
seeking in Wall Street and the other, the free-market approach, blaming lax mone-
tary policy leading to the housing bubble and extensive regulation that curtailed 
and sustained growth. The basic distinction is in the response to the crisis where 
the (New) Keynesians urge for more intervention, ﬁ  nancial regulation and gove-
rnment stimuli as the drivers of growth. On the other hand the free-marketers try 
2 Low inflation resulting in higher real interest rates was not the only reason why Germany did not experi  ence 
an asset price boom, but it was nonetheless one of the factors. 



















































































































96 to prove that more government and regulation are not the answer and can only 
lead to further stunting of growth. 
Those who urge for tightening of regulatory standards such as Akerlof and Shiller 
(2009), Krugman (2009, 2010), Stiglitz (2010) and Bernanke (2010) point out that 
banks and Wall Street in general behaved in such a way because they were not 
submissive enough to controls from the government institutions. Banks were al-
lowed to take too many risks and the market did not (and by some means could 
not) punish them. Deregulation brought the system down as it was responsible for 
allowing government enterprises to focus more on proﬁ  ts and less on their social 
goals, which led them to behave like predatory lenders. Monetary policy is di-
smissed as a cause because their low-rate policy was justiﬁ  ed by a jobless recovery 
in the post-2001 recession period, accompanied with fears of a deﬂ  ationary trap. 
The bubble on the housing market was due to large capital inﬂ  ows into the US that 
lowered interest rates and increased incentives for mortgage lending and home 
ownership. The bubble started to inﬂ  ate as ﬁ  nancial innovation through the secu-
ritization of mortgages and their repackaging into new types of securities made 
this possible. As more and more securities were being underwritten, the bubble 
grew even larger. This led to further greed on the ﬁ  nancial market where the inve-
stors were led by “animal spirits”, instead of rational expectations and were inve-
sting more than they should have. This psychological category was even more 
visible when the downturn occurred, as it added to the instability of the markets. 
The only mistake of the monetary authorities was a lack of regulatory oversight 
that could have prevented the recessionary effects. 
From this standpoint it is obvious that this crisis and the bubble-burst of the hou-
sing market are inevitable in the economy as it moves in cycles, in which, after 
long periods of economic success, a period of economic downturn arises. The 
causes are in the market itself and its participants who become too greedy and who 
seek extraordinary proﬁ  ts in good times. This is why government intervention is 
needed as the government alone is powerful enough to stimulate the economy out 
of a recession and bring it back to its pre-crisis high growth levels. Without its 
intervention unemployment would rise and demand would plummet, public unrest 
causing the system to be even more vulnerable than it already is. 
The free-marketers such as Cochrane (2009), Taylor (2009), Friedman (2009), 
Roberts (2010), Wallison (2010) claim the opposite. The market was being con-
strained from punishing those who were inefﬁ  cient, too risky and irresponsible. 
The regulators imposed housing policies, tax cuts and bank capital restrictions 
that gave incentives to the banks to ﬁ  ll up their assets with mortgage-based secu-
rities. Increasing leverage and risk-taking followed by an increase in home values 
which sustained the high growth of the ﬁ  nancial sector are all a consequence of 



















































































































97 nment institutions were guiding them into. The area in which the free market 
could function was constrained. 
According to them, the idea of a global savings glut that led to low interest rates 
and fuelled the housing bubble does not provide a full explanation. Irrational exu-
berance and animal spirits were present on the market, but they were not crucial 
in explaining what contributed to bubble growth and herd behaviour. Monetary 
policy played a crucial role as the interest rates were down to historically low le-
vels and remained this way for too long. 
Although both of these views offer an interesting examination of why the system 
got ﬁ  lled up with risk and how it was possible that the policymakers could not ﬁ  nd 
a proper response, the focus of this paper is not in explaining various views as to 
what created the recession. Rather, its main purpose is to provide a political eco-
nomy view on why the market crashed and on the nature of the policies responsi-
ble for the state in which the market found itself. It has no intention to explain or 
analyse the complete American ﬁ  nancial sector. The intention is to identify and 
demonstrate the correlation between political decisions that guided market parti-
cipants and the causes of the recession. 
3.1 BANK RISK TAKING
Until the 2000s the subprime mortgage market was relatively small in size and it 
was carried mostly by commercial and investment banks whose goal was to buy 
these mortgages from underwriters, repackage them into mortgage-backed securi-
ties (MBSs) and sell them further while backed by the payment of principal and 
interest on the mortgages. These MBSs were structured by classes with the same 
collateral but a different level of risk. They were later bought by investors whose 
interest was the return in the form of interest payments on the mortgages paid by 
the mortgage owners. 
The crisis originated in the United States in the housing and mortgage market 
where people were buying and selling houses in the hope of making a proﬁ  t. They 
invested mostly borrowed money into buying real-estate as the safest possible 
investment whose price was constantly increasing. As an answer to this increased 
demand on the housing market the ﬁ  nancial institutions increased their credit 
expansion, lowered lending standards and decreased their interest rates. This re-
sulted in two effects: it increased the debt of households4 and it increased the 
banks’ demand for other sources of ﬁ  nancing. The lack of own sources was com-
pensated for by borrowing from other institutions until the amount of debt became 
unsustainable, i.e. when it could not be paid out of its own capital5. 
4 The trend of lagging growth of real wages compared to the real GDP growth added to this increasing hou-
sehold debt and a decrease of domestic savings.
5 Lehman Brothers borrowed 30 times more than the amount of its own capital. This was impossible to return 



















































































































98 This lethal combination of easy credit and rising debt accumulation accompanied 
by large inﬂ  ows of foreign funds fuelled a housing construction boom which led 
to the rise of the US housing bubble. Based on these rising prices and ﬁ  nancial 
innovation6 many investors, both from the US and worldwide, invested into the 
US housing market. As the prices went down, those who had invested in the boom 
started reporting losses. In parallel, ordinary investors, due to their home values 
now being worth less than mortgage loans contracted, started to be affected by 
foreclosures, and thus a downward spiral was created.
Banks and investment ﬁ  nancial institutions who seem to be traditionally conser-
vative and cautious and who tend to act within their legal boundaries that suppress 
irresponsible behaviour, went into risk taking and acted quite the opposite to their 
previous practices. The main cause of such willingness to engage in risk taking 
was the new regulatory framework for their activities. They had a “safety net” in 
case something went wrong. By issuing home loans the banks took out insurance 
for their credit portfolio in terms of credit default swaps (CDSs). These instru-
ments acted as insurance policies (although they formally were not insurance con-
tracts) that guaranteed down payment to the banks in the case of foreclosure or an 
inability to repay interest. The CDSs were obtained in insurance companies such 
as American International Group (AIG). In the case of rising housing prices the 
safety net functioned well. Having a back-up in insurance instruments the banks 
started offering home loans to people who did not meet the usual criteria, people 
with low and irregular incomes. The system was based on a never-ending growth 
in housing prices notwithstanding the risk of potentially negative effects if the 
prices suddenly started falling. The overheating in the system led to the fall of 
real-estate prices, i.e. to a burst bubble on the housing market and the inability to 
service the loans. The banks were not able to pay back the money borrowed from 
other institutions. Insurance companies could not afford to compensate the losses 
and the safety net proved to be an illusion. 
3.2 THE HOUSING BUBBLE
Ofﬁ  cial policies of the Bush and Clinton administrations gave support to rising 
household debt accumulation by their policies of making sure every citizen had a 
home. Lack of ﬁ  nancial and credit strength of households was compensated by the 
government through its speciﬁ  c measures (such as the Tax Relief Act or the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act). The government was encouraging commercial and 
investment banks to give out mortgage loans by guaranteeing them through its 
government entities. This increased the scope of investing into real-estate; it 
affected the growth of real-estate prices and led to a loosening of lending standar-
ds for new subprime mortgages. This, in turn, opened space for ﬁ  nancial innova-
tion of securities and derivatives. The assumption for an asset bubble growth was 
created. Speculative bubbles are deﬁ  ned as “increases of asset prices that have no 
6 Recognized through the creation of various new financial derivatives such as mortgage-based securities 



















































































































99 rational economic explanation in which the market prices move quite the opposite 
than when determined by market conditions. The high prices are only temporary 
and they act as an effect of the enthusiasm of investors, rather than a consistent 
evaluation of their real asset value” (Shiller, 2006). The bursting of the bubble on 
the market in real terms means changing the direction of price movements, which 
are readjusted to their real value. On the housing market in the US there existed an 
irrational growth of real estate prices, which had deviated from the “equilibrium” 
path determined by market forces. 
FIGURE 5
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Robert Shiller created an index of relative housing prices7 in the United States 
with a basis year being set as 1890, which shows the movement of house prices up 
until today (ﬁ  gure 5). The highest growth in housing prices in the given 120 year 
period took place between 1998 (right after the ofﬁ  cial decision of the government 
that everyone should have a home, no matter what the price) and 2006. A house 
that was worth $110,000 by the end of 1998 was worth $200,000 by the middle of 
2006, presenting an 85% increase in prices. The prices were increasing up until 
the point when the demand for housing could not keep track of its high prices 
leading to a downward pressure on the prices, which started to fall by the end of 
2006. 
7 The S&P Case-Shiller U.S. Home Price Index measures the values of single-family housing within the Uni-
ted States. The index measures changes in housing market prices given a constant level of quality. It uses the 
“repeat sales method” of index calculation which uses the data on properties that have sold at least twice, in 



















































































































100 The ﬁ  nancial industry was interlinked with these price movements by issuing 
MBSs and other derivatives whose returns were based on the strong growth of 
housing prices. It was common sense at the time that MBSs could diversify risk 
because they were protected from local misbalances due to their geographical di-
versiﬁ  cation. If one part of the country were to experience a decline in prices, their 
returns wouldn’t be jeopardized because the rise in prices would be continued in 
other parts of the country. The expectations did not take into account what would 
happen if the entire country experienced a housing market crash. 
Figure 6 offers a closer look at the link between housing prices and the Fed key 
interest rate in the last 35 year period. It shows that changes in housing prices are 
negatively related with the level of the Fed interest rate. When interest rates were 
high, housing prices declined, and as soon as the interest rates started to fall the 
housing prices would rise, although they did so with a certain lag, as the change in 
interest rates would always precede the change in housing prices by roughly a one 
to two year period. In the last decade, the housing prices started to rise rapidly 
around 2001, followed by a gradual decrease of the interest rate. When the interest 
rate hit its lowest levels the housing price increases were closing in on their peak. 
The Fed’s decision to raise interest rates in 2004 again resulted in a lag on the 
housing market as the prices did not decrease until 2006. However, this sharp 
decrease was not all due to a rising interest rate. If it had been, the fall would not 
have been so severe; rather it would have had the same scope as the interest rate 
movement as it did in previous years. This latest drop in housing prices was not a 
complete consequence of the interest rate movement, although the interest rate 
movement could have been the trigger that led to a decline in home prices. The 
answer to what caused the drop to be so rapid and robust lies in out-of-the-model 
factors, such as political decisions that created incentives to invest into housing, 
which will be dealt with later in the text. 
FIGURE 6
Comparison of housing price changes and the Fed interest rate (%)















































































































































101 3.3 CRISIS SPILL-OVER TO THE REAL SECTOR
Political intervention to stabilize the ﬁ  nancial market is intensiﬁ  ed by negative 
spill-over effects on the real sector. This is especially evident in the rising unem-
ployment, which jeopardizes social and political stability. In the integrated market, 
on which spill-over effects act fast, the risk on the ﬁ  nancial sector is rapidly spread 
around to other sectors. In a banking crisis the amount of loans decline and beco-
me more expensive resulting in difﬁ  culties for the private sector. The crisis on the 
ﬁ  nancial market caused by a credit contraction (due to risk increases and the stren-
gthening of lending criteria) tends to lead to a real sector activity drop and conse-
quently a fall in production and employment. A decrease in demand on the world’s 
largest market brings about a decline of imports in the US, a decrease of other 
countries’ exports to the US and consequently a fall in production, growth of 
unemployment and a GDP decrease in most countries of the globalized world. 
The fall of sales and proﬁ  ts in the real sector is reﬂ  ected in decreasing private 
sector net present value which is reﬂ  ected in the stock market. And vice versa, a 
decline in the stock market decreases the amount of money available, offers more 
expensive loans, meaning fewer loans for the private sector, a fall in production 
and proﬁ  ts and a loss of jobs. 
A fall in employment levels increases political pressures, and governments try to 
ﬁ  nd an answer in ﬁ  scal stimuli to bolster demand, revive production and turn 
around the unemployment trend. This increases budget expenditures and therefore 
the budget deﬁ  cit, which cannot be balanced by levying extra taxes but only by 
additional debt accumulation. The growing public debt in the US has already rea-
ched unprecedented levels, which increase the risk of future instability and crises. 
The reaction of governments to breakdowns in the ﬁ  nancial market, a decrease of 
exports, decrease of home and foreign demand, growth of unemployment and 
consequently social turmoil often consists of protectionist measures that can only 
deepen the crisis. Social turmoil and further instability can result in the strengthe-
ning of populism and authoritarian solutions and to further endangering of demo-
cratic orders. 
The crisis has strengthened the interventionist and regulatory powers of the gover-
nment, which in the short run, in order to maintain political stability, may prove to 
be simulative of economic recovery. However, in the long run this may prove to be 
a risky orientation. It is unlikely that substituting government for the market can 
prove to be an efﬁ  cient answer, at least not in the long run. Empirical testing is 
needed to prove the riskiness of such a trend on future economic growth. It is essen-
tial to restore the faith in the market as the most efﬁ  cient way of creating wealth. 
4 REGULATORY AND POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE CRISES
4.1 REGULATION AND SYSTEMIC RISK
Greed and corruption seem to be the most popular two causes that are being bla-



















































































































102 denies the existence of these motives, as they are always present, there is no evi-
dence that they culminated in 2007-2008 and caused the crisis. The ﬁ  nancial insti-
tutions invested into only the safest securities with an AAA rating, as determined 
by the authorised rating agencies and rated as securities with the minimum risk 
and therefore the lowest return. It is questionable to link investing into low-risk 
AAA securities with greed for extra proﬁ  ts. Investors were behaving rationally in 
this case. The reasons for increasing investments into MBSs and hence bolstering 
the housing bubble should be seen in regulatory policy decisions. The policies of 
the legislative and executive government were made for the political goals of 
gaining voters. Combined with an increasing inﬂ  uence of lobbyists and various 
interest groups this resulted in the gradual creation of systemic risk for the ﬁ  nan-
cial system. Systemic risk was built in by regulatory decisions such as affordable 
housing policies, granting an oligopoly to rating agencies, activities of govern-
ment sponsored enterprises on the mortgage market and by additional regulations 
imposed on banks’ capital. Systemic risk created in this way was not a consequen-
ce of bad intentions; it was concealed behind desires to reform business activity 
by diminishing or even eliminating risk and uncertainty. The origin of increased 
risk-taking lies in the informational and cognitive basis of regulatory decisions 
which have a much narrower effect than when they are spontaneously created by 
market regulations. Even in the case of public good provision where market failu-
res do exist, the acquisition of public goods by the government is much more efﬁ  -
cient in a market environment than in a collectivistic economy. The efﬁ  ciency of 
the ﬁ  nancial market is being decreased with growing regulation bestowed upon it, 
thus increasing its systemic risk. 
4.2 FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC: GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES
Government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac) both had a crucial role in creating the bubble on the housing market. Their 
main goal was to purchase loans from banks on the subprime mortgage market. 
Once in ownership of the loan they take full responsibility for it, receiving intere-
sts on a monthly basis and taking over the risks of default on the loan. Fannie and 
Freddie have the option of either keeping these loans as a source of monthly reve-
nue or repackaging them and selling them as mortgage-backed securities to inve-
stors. The banks use the money from selling their loans to acquire new mortgage 
loans and the entire cycle is continued. Mortgage prices rise as a source of addi-
tional mortgage loan creation from the banks selling them to the GSEs. “By in-
creasing the demand for mortgages in the secondary market, the GSEs can reduce 
the interest rates the homebuyers pay on the mortgages in the primary market, 
fostering home ownership” (Levine, 2010) which was their main purpose created 
by the government. 
Securities issued by the GSEs were marked as government issued securities and 



















































































































103 due to the general notion that they would be bailed out by the government if they 
experienced any solvency or liquidity problems. 
By the end of 1990s as the real estate market expanded, so did the inﬂ  uence of the 
GSEs on that market. By the time the government took over their business in 2008 
they had acquired half of all American MBSs and three quarters of newly issued 
mortgages (HUD, 2008). Since 1999 Fannie Mae had been lowering standards for 
buying mortgages from banks who were favoured to “expand the MBS business 
to those individuals whose credit rating is not good enough to even get an ordinary 
loan” (Friedman, 2009). The total amount of mortgage loans with a low down 
payment that Fannie and Freddie bought had quadrupled in the period between 
1998 and 2003 (table 1). By 2007 Fannie and Freddie were the owners of a quarter 
of all mortgage loans issued with an interest rate less than 5%. 
TABLE 1
Total purchases of mortgage loans by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with low 
interest payments
Year
Total amount of mortgage loans with 
a repayment lower than 5% owned 
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
(in thousands of mortgage loans)
Percentage of mortgage loans with 
a repayment lower than 5% in total 
mortgage loans owned by Fannie 











Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 2008b; and Roberts, 
2010:29. 
The Housing and Urban Department (HUD) instituted a set of housing policy 
goals as a part of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness 
Act of 1992. The most interesting one concerned the Low-and Moderate-Income 



















































































































104 tgage loans from low and moderate income borrowers as the goal determined 
(HUD, 2008). Table 2 shows how these goals were being overachieved by Fannie 
and Freddie. The Congress set a policy through the HUD that the GSEs must buy 
a pre-determined amount of these mortgage loans and made unlimited funding 
available to them in order to attain the political goal. This in turn resulted in Fan-
nie and Freddie’s high involvement in the mortgage market. 
TABLE 2
Low-and moderate-income:a mortgage loans owned by Fannie and Freddie with 
respect to HUD’s goals (% of total low-and moderate-income mortgage loans)
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Fannie Mae 49.5 51.5 51.8 52.3 53.4 55.1 56.9 55.5
Freddie Mac 49.9 53.2 50.3 51.2 51.6 54 55.9 56.1
HUD goals 42 50 50 50 50 52 53 55
a Households with income less than or equal to median income.
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 2008a.
However, certain claims say that the growth of the subprime mortgage market was 
primarily underwritten by private mortgage lenders like Countrywide, not by Fan-
nie and Freddie. “Fannie and Freddie accounted for a sharply reduced share of the 
home lending market as a whole during the peak years of the bubble. To the extent 
that they did purchase dubious home loans, they were in pursuit of proﬁ  t, not so-
cial objectives – in effect; they were trying to catch up with private lenders” 
(Krugman, 2010). 
According to the Housing and Urban Department (HUD) the GSEs had acquired 
more subprime mortgages than rest of the market altogether (HUD, 2008). Their 
advantage was funding at a very low cost which meant that they had “no compe-
tition for any asset they were willing to buy” (Wallison, 2009). Their entrance into 
the subprime mortgage market justiﬁ  ed by reaching the government targets resul-
ted in their rapidly achieving the dominant position on that market.
The impact of the GSEs on the mortgage market meant that more and more origi-
nators of mortgage loans would strive to extend them to dubious borrowers, as 
they now had an artiﬁ  cially created market for these kinds of securities. “There 
was a huge frenzy at the originator level to produce the subprime and Alt-A loans 
that would then be sold to the GSEs” (Wallison, 2009). Because of their impact 
the market was growing. And the only way the GSEs were able to make proﬁ  ts 
was for the market to keep on growing. They were therefore beneﬁ  ting from eco-
nomies of scale. The Fed also made a study on this matter that showed that “the 



















































































































105 buyers – the central justiﬁ  cation they always claimed for their existence” (Green-
span, 2010). In addition to this Alan Greenspan warned the Congress in his testi-
mony before the US Senate of the potential hazardous effects Fannie and Freddie 
could have upon the system. He warned of increasing mortgage securitization and 
a threat of creating systemic risk for the US ﬁ  nancial system if the GSEs were to 
become too large and gain a huge share of the home mortgage market (Greenspan, 
2005). The Congress neglected many warnings and did nothing.
The behaviour, however, did not go unnoticed in the political arena. The opposi-
tion Republicans (before 2001) were calling for additional regulation and supervi-
sion of Fannie and Freddie, while the Democrats responded accusing the Republi-
cans of being against “affordable housing” for all Americans, preserving the sta-
tus quo. In addition to that both Fannie and Freddie were reliable sources of cam-
paign donations for mostly Democrats (table 3). Democratic candidates received 
twice as many contributions as the Republicans in the twenty year period. Politi-
cal elites and Fannie and Freddie were mutually beneﬁ  ting from their lobbying 
and campaign donations creating thus a privileged position for the GSEs on the 
market. This resulted in the previously mentioned lack of competition for the go-
vernment-protected companies as well as their ease of ﬁ  nancing. 
The political implication in the story behind Fannie and Freddie is worth noticing, 
as for some reason the need to reform Fannie and Freddie has been neglected by 
the new regulatory bill in Congress. The GSEs inﬂ  uence among Congress mem-
bers, especially on those who wrote the bill (Senator Dodd and Congressman 
Frank in particular) is still intact as the funds are “ﬂ  owing” from the GSEs to the 
Congress members 8.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were included in the political decisions of the Ame-
rican government for obtaining its political goal of expanding the availability of 
loans for buying houses to all social groups, especially to low-income minorities. 
The risk was becoming inherent to them by the dictate made by government poli-
cies, which was to escalate in the case of a recession or falling housing prices. The 
ﬁ  rst to be hit by this possible recession were the social groups with low and unsta-
ble incomes. The regulatory decisions demanded from Fannie and Freddie a re-
purchase of mortgage loans and securities from those who could not have made 
regular down payments. This was all due to the pursuit of a populist government 
policy – that everyone is entitled to a home, with no regard to their income, as the 
ﬁ  ght against homelessness and poverty leads to election success, disregarding the 
long run effect. 
8 Both of the companies were strategically giving large donations to those politicians who were sitting in the 
boards regulating their industry. Fifteen of the 25 listed members of the House and the Senate that gained the 
most campaign funds were either members of the House Financial Services Committee, the Senate Banking, 
Housing & Urban Affairs Committee or the Senate Finance Committee. Senator Dodd, with the most gran-
ted campaign funds, is the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, while Congressman Kanjorski is the 
Chairman of the Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponso-




















































































































4.3 COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND POLITICAL ENCOURAGEMENT 
OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
One of the pressures on Fannie and Freddie to enter the subprime mortgage market 
was the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). Although it was legislated back in 
1977 it was revised several times since, the most important revision arriving in 
1995 when the government changed the Act so as to “force the banks who issue 
mortgage loans to prove a more active contribution to lending towards unprivile-
ged social groups within their communities such as minorities” (Niskanen, 1995). 
TABLE 3









  1)   Dodd, 
Christopher 
Democratic-CT 133.9
  6)   Bennett, 
Robert F.
Republican-UT 61.4




  9) Davis, 
Tom
Republican-VA 55.4
  3) Obama, Barack Democratic-IL 105.8




  4) Clinton, Hillary Democratic-NY 75.5
11)   Bachus, 
Spencer
Republican-AL 55.3
  5) Kanjorski, Paul  Democratic-PA 65.5
12)   Shelby, 
Richard 
Republican-AL 55.0
  7) Johnson, Tim Democratic-SD 61.0 19) Blunt, Roy Republican-MO 36.5
  8) Conrad, Kent Democratic-ND 58.9
20)   Pryce, 
Deborah
Republican-OH 34.7
13) Emanuel, Rahm Democratic-IL 51.7
21)   Miller, 
Gary
Republican-CA 33.0
14) Reed, Jack Democratic-RI 50.7
23)   Reynolds, 
Tom
Republican-NY 32.7
15) Carper, Tom Democratic-DE 44.3
*Annotation: The numbers by the names of the 
representatives mark the rank of the amount of 






17)   Maloney, 
Carolyn 
Democratic-NY 38.7
18) Bean, Melissa Democratic-IL 37.2
22) Pelosi, Nancy Democratic-CA 32.7




25)   Hooley, 
Darlene
Democratic-OR 28.7
Total Democrats  966.7 Total Republicans   419.6



















































































































107 The regulator was even threatening law suits against those banks who do not lend 
to minorities in the legally proscribed amounts. 
Stan Liebowitz from the University of Texas was investigating the policies regar-
ding the housing market from 1990 to 2006. He pointed out that “perhaps these 
weaker lending standards that every government agency involved with housing 
tried to advance, that the Congress tried to advance, that the presidency tried to 
advance, that the GSEs tried to advance – and with which the penitent banks ini-
tially went along and eventually supported with enthusiasm – might lead to high 
defaults, particularly if housing prices should stop rising” (Woods, 2009).
The banks, along with the GSEs were following the government’s instructions. 
They weren’t deliberately lowering interest rates or their lending standards thus 
making them more available to riskier borrowers. The reasons behind the banks 
giving loans to people who simply could not afford to become homeowners lies 
primary in politically governed decisions which only resulted in increasing the 
risk of the banking sector in dealing with real estates and MBSs. 
The government, through encouraging homeownership, created an artiﬁ  cial de-
mand on the housing market, leading to its further distortion. This was visible 
through a series of policy Acts instituted in the 90s the effects of which were not 
visible until 2006. The constructers also received outstanding privileges, beneﬁ  ts 
and reliefs for building a house (which continued to when the supply shrunk and 
the people stopped buying houses). Due to rising social injustice and due to their 
policies of resource redistribution, government regulation led to even riskier loans 
and poor investment decisions resulting in an even bigger misallocation of the 
very resources they were to reallocate. Loan requirements were softened due to 
the short run interests of politicians thinking only of how to win the next election 
and remain in power. The affordable housing idea proved to be a political trick 
with costly unintended consequences.
4.4 THE RATING AGENCY OLIGOPOLY
The rating agencies were, like Fannie and Freddie, privately owned companies 
that enjoyed large government beneﬁ  ts. A large amount of institutional investors 
such as retirement funds, insurance companies and banks were forbidden to pur-
chase securities with a lower rating than BBB as determined by the recognized 
rating agencies. The regulator in certain cases allowed only the purchase of hi-
ghest AAA rated securities creating thus a favourable market for credit rating 
agencies. In 1975 a government regulating agency, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), gave an oligopoly status to three rating agencies in the US. Stan-
dard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch became the only agencies that had the right to 
give out ofﬁ  cial ratings to various market securities. They were set as NRSROs 



















































































































108 ones good enough to comply with SECs regulatory requirements in order to eva-
luate the riskiness of a security. 
Such a decision brought about a large distortion of the ﬁ  nancial market as the 
impact of the decision had severe consequences on ﬁ  nancial stability. The regula-
tors restricted the supply of ratings, empowering only the NRSROs to provide 
ratings to which the rest of the ﬁ  nancial industry needed to comply. They also 
increased the demand for rating agencies services as the entire ﬁ  nancial industry 
that was under regulatory supervision had to use the NRSROs ratings in order to 
determine their capital requirements. The government was also using the same 
ratings, as all the securities issued by the government, including its GSEs, were 
rated with the highest investment grade. Companies that would not use the 
NRSROs ratings faced a limited market for their securities. The system became 
much too dependent on the role of the rating agencies. 
“The rating agencies faced little market discipline, had no signiﬁ  cant regulatory 
oversight, were protected from competition by regulators and enjoyed a burgeo-
ning market for their services” (Levine, 2010). In a situation with limited compe-
tition due to a restricted access of entry to the market the agencies had no incenti-
ve to use up-to-date methods and no incentive to reveal their credit making pro-
cess creating thus a lack of transparency. There was no market-correcting mecha-
nism to ensure accuracy. In addition, the agencies operated in a particular business 
model where the “issuer pays” for the rating. Before the 1970s the agencies were 
operating in an “investor pays” model where if one agency was giving out bad 
ratings the customer would simply buy the rating from one of its competitors. The 
new model of “issuer pays” automatically implies the problem of a conﬂ  ict of in-
terest. Companies prefer favourable ratings as this can lower their costs of capital. 
They care less about the accuracy of the rating. Since the rating agencies depend 
on revenue from the securities issuers, who wish for the best ratings possible, the 
desire of the agencies to please their customers may result in sub-optimal ratings. 
The rating agencies dismissed the idea that they were in conﬂ  ict of interest as they 
rely on “reputational capital” meaning that if investors ﬁ  gure out that a certain 
rating agency is giving out bad ratings (meaning that they are too high with res-
pect to the risk of an asset or company) this agency would soon start losing repu-
tation. The loss of reputation would result in loss of clients as the issuers would 
now turn to different agencies for rating evaluation not wanting to lose potential 
investors in their securities because of the link to the bad rating agency. Issuers 
would reduce their demand for this agency and this would result in the reduction 
of the agency’s future proﬁ  ts and would cause problems in the long-run. However, 
in order for the reputational capital argument to stand, there needs to exist a wide 
variety of competitors to which the issuers can turn to. The NRSRO concept im-
plies that all those ﬁ  nancial institutions that need to serve the capital regulation 



















































































































109 addition to that there is not much competition in the ratings market especially 
when all three agencies use similar methods and have similar incentives. 
The effect of the condition the rating agencies found themselves in is that, altho-
ugh private, due to their oligopoly position, they could use any techniques they 
wished for evaluating the riskiness of a company or an asset, “while their ﬁ  nancial 
success did not depend on the outcomes of these techniques to produce a certain 
something that someone is willing to buy” (Friedman, 2009). If the rating agen-
cies are making bad decisions and therefore sending wrong signals to investors 
they can’t be held account for their actions as they are protected by their NRSRO 
status. In addition to that the rating agencies cannot be sued due to wrong or 
misjudged ratings as they only provide opinions and are therefore protected by the 
First Amendment of the US Constitution. Their imprecision and bad evaluations 
could not have hurt their proﬁ  ts, because they did not have any competition to 
punish them for doing a poor job. For example, according to Friedman (2009) 
“Moody’s hasn’t updated its main statistical assumptions on the American mort-
gage-backed securities market since 2002. This means that the dynamics of an 
unprecedented growth on the housing and the mortgage market wasn’t taken into 
account at all”. Rating agencies took full advantage of working in such a distorted 
environment. This was obvious in the cases of Enron and Lehman Brothers whose 
ratings held high up to only a couple of days before bankruptcy. Also academic 
research concluded that rating agencies “lag stock price movements by about 18 
months” (Levine, 2010). Such behaviour could have been prevented in an open 
competition credit ratings market in which imprecision and neglect in estimates 
would have been punished by the loss of reputation, clients and money. The regu-
lator did not allow this as it favoured private agencies and allowed them to be 
ineffective and corruptive. 
4.5 INCREASING FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE RECOURSE RULE 
Rating agencies errors are important because of the link they have with existing 
banking regulation standards that demanded from banks to ﬁ  ll up their assets with 
AAA rated securities. “Securities rated AA or better qualiﬁ  ed for a lower capital 
requirement. Normally, banks are required to have capital equal to 4 percent of the 
value of mortgages held. But those with an implicit government guarantee, such 
as securities issued by Fannie Mae, only required capital equal to 1.6 percent of 
asset value. Once AA rated, CDOs qualiﬁ  ed for the same lower capital require-
ment that applied to quasi-government securities, putting even more pressure on 
the credit rating agencies to inﬂ  ate ratings. That would free up bank capital for 
additional proﬁ  t-making investments.” (Bartlett, 2010). The reason why invest-
ment and commercial banks engaged in buying MBSs instead of, for example 
Treasury Bills, considered to be the safest possible investment, lies in another re-
gulatory decision – the recourse rule enforced by the Federal Reserve, Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Ofﬁ  ce of Thrift Supervision in 2001 as an 



















































































































110 According to this rule American banks were required to spend more capital on 
commercial and corporate loans and less capital for investing into asset-backed 
securities, such as MBSs, as long as these securities were rated AAA or were is-
sued by the GSEs. Basically, this rule implies that for every $100 investment into 
mortgage-based securities, $2 in capital was required, compared to $5 for the 
same amount in mortgage loans and $10 for the same amount in commercial 
loans9 (Friedman and Kraus, 2010). This rule was designed to guide the banks 
funds into allegedly less risky assets, such as AAA MBSs issued by Fannie or 
Freddie. “The fact that 93 percent of the banks’ mortgage-backed securities were 
either AAA rated or were issued by a GSE shows that this is exactly what the rule 
accomplished” (ibid, 2010). It ﬁ  lled the banks’ balances with what later proved to 
be toxic and high risk assets. 
In addition to steering bank investments, the recourse rule may have been one of 
the causes of increasing housing prices throughout the US. The more MBSs were 
bought and packaged by the banks that were following the capital standards, the 
more mortgages had to be written so as to cope with the rising demand. This crea-
ted an artiﬁ  cial demand for AAA mortgage-based securities. In order to satisfy the 
demand there was an increasing need to underwrite asset-backed securities, of 
which the safest were mortgage-backed, as housing prices always increase. The 
artiﬁ  cially created demand for MBSs could prove to be one of the explanations 
behind lower lending standards that made mortgage loans more available to low-
income borrowers. 
Regarding the fact that bank investments, government policies and government 
sponsored enterprises were guiding the decisions of market participants, it could 
be inferred that the global ﬁ  nancial crisis was caused by regulation, or better yet 
by failed government intervention on the market. It would be wrong to accuse the 
banks of taking too much risk or being too greedy in this case. They were simply 
exploiting the given proﬁ  t opportunity. Their investments and incentives were 
guided into wrong assets by the policies set by regulators in order to avoid risk 
taking. The regulators tried to change the behaviour of market participants in a 
way that seemed optimal. By doing so they negatively inﬂ  uenced the subprime 
mortgage market, sending wrong signals to investors that led to the distortion of 
the ﬁ  nancial and housing market.
It is not realistic that a central regulator can make better decisions on which types 
of assets to invest in than a private investor. Every market participant is best left 
alone in assessing its investment decisions as well as the riskiness of an invest-
ment. When investment decisions are proscribed by law this brings about a distor-
tion of the market, as potentially efﬁ  cient investments are being substituted with 
those determined by the legislator. This means that successful projects are being 
left out for the purpose of achieving politically determined goals. Regulatory de-



















































































































111 cisions adopted preceding the crisis created an artiﬁ  cial demand for mortgage-
based securities which further led to an increase of the demand for mortgage loans, 
loosening of lending standards and an increase of the risk of default on the loans. 
The consequence was an inﬂ  ated housing bubble. Every artiﬁ  cially created de-
mand which is based on political rather than market decisions leads to artiﬁ  cial 
price growth and to privileging certain interest groups, assets or investments. 
5 MONETARY POLICY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
At the beginning of the decade the American Federal Reserve Board was leading 
a highly expansionary monetary policy in order to alleviate the shocks that had hit 
the US economy at the beginning of the decade (such as the dot-com boom, the 
9/11 attacks followed by an invasion of ﬁ  rst Afghanistan and then Iraq, and a se-
ries of corporate scandals throughout 2002). By increasing the money supply and 
lowering its reference interest rate to historically low levels the Fed prevented the 
possible recession threatening the economy at the time. However, the easy money 
policy had a contrary effect as it created a favourable environment for further 
mortgage expansion. 
The key indicator of a central banks’ monetary policy is its reference interest rate. 
In the US this refers to the federal funds rate determined by the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC). It presents the overnight rate by which the banks 
lend funds to one another. 
FIGURE 7
The Fed key interest rate: FOMC overnight federal funds rate (%)
Source: Federal Reserve Board, 2010.
The overnight federal funds rate classiﬁ  es as an open market operation maintained 
by central banks as one of the key instruments of monetary policy. Open market 
operations became the main instrument of developed nations’ central banks as 
through the movement of key interest rates one can draw conclusions on what is the 



















































































































































112 recession, the rate decreased from 6.5% at the end of 2000 to 1.75% in December 
2001 and eventually to a record low 1% in June 2003 where it remained for almost 
a year (ﬁ  gure 7). The reason behind such an expansionary monetary policy was a 
slow recovery with rising unemployment (peaking at 6% in the ﬁ  rst half of 2003) 
and a slow GDP growth rate (an average of less than 2%) combined with fears of 
deﬂ  ation and the possibility of experiencing a depression decade such as Japan in 
the 1990s (Bernanke, 2010).
One of the crucial questions on the current crisis has been concerning the Fed’s 
monetary policy and whether it had an effect on housing prices. One way of exa-
mining the scope of monetary policy effects is by using the Taylor rule. This po-
pular policy guidance rule was created by John Taylor (1993) of the University of 
Stanford. The Taylor rule examines monetary policy by relating the overnight 
federal funds interest rate to tradeoffs in inﬂ  ation (difference between the real and 
target inﬂ  ation rate) and output (difference of current output from the potential 
output):
  .  (1)
Where:
it; recommended key interest rate for a given period in time, t
rt
*; long-run key interest rate, estimate rt
* = 2
πt; real rate of inﬂ  ation in a given period of time, t
(πt – π∗
t); difference between real and target inﬂ  ation rate in a given period of 
time 
; output gap, difference between real and potential output in a given period 
of time
a, b > 0, a, b ∈ 0,1 =, a+b = 1; parameters which describe how the interest rate 
reacts on inﬂ  ation and output deviations from their target and potential levels.
According to the Taylor rule the federal funds interest rates should be higher when 
inﬂ  ation is above its target level (π – π*) > 0 or when real output is higher than 
potential output (y – y*) > 0. Taylor estimated a long-term value of the federal 
funds rate to be around 2%. His rule basically shows that when output and inﬂ  a-
tion are equal to their potential rates, the federal funds rate should be 2 plus the 
level of inﬂ  ation. 
An important thing to determine while calculating the Taylor rule rate are the va-
lues of a and b parameters for inﬂ  ation and output gaps. Both of the parameters 
should be positive and have a value of 0.5 giving therefore the same weight to 
both inﬂ  ation and output. The same weight given to output and inﬂ  ation is justi-
ﬁ  ed by the fact that a stable price level and economic growth represented two 
main goals of central banks, an assumption that will be questioned later on. The 



















































































































113 policy) when the inﬂ  ation is above its target rate or when output is above its full 
employment level. This would result in a decrease of inﬂ  ationary pressures. In the 
opposite scenario it anticipates a low interest rate so as to stimulate output. Accor-
ding to the Taylor rule an increase of inﬂ  ation by 1 basis point should result in an 
increase of the nominal interest rate by more than one basis point10 (Taylor, 
1993). 
The long-run Fed target inﬂ  ation rate for the US, used in the calculation, revolved 
around 2%. The data used for calculating the potential output were taken from the 
Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce (CBO, the institution that ofﬁ  cially measures the 
potential output for the US). By inserting the mentioned variables in the Taylor 
model the next equation is obtained:
  it = 2 + πt + 0.5(πt+ πt
*) + 0.5(yt – : yt)  (2)
The data for inﬂ  ation and output gaps are given in table A in the appendix. By 
putting in the given values of the variables in equation (2) the quarter rates for the 
suggested Taylor rule interest rate were obtained. Between the ﬁ  rst quarters of 
2002 up until the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2006 the Fed was conducting a restrictive mone-
tary policy and the interest rate was too low in comparison with the real economic 
conditions at the time (ﬁ  gure 8). The Taylor interest rate did not fall below 3% in 
the period when the federal funds rate was locked down at 1%. The Taylor rate 
even rose to 4 and more percent suggesting an increase of the federal funds rate. 
The market was sending signals of an increasing economic activity at the time, to 
which the Fed should have replied by increasing its interest rate. According to this 
analysis the Fed disregarded the market signals and continued with an expansio-
nary monetary policy giving an additional boost to the growth of the housing 
bubble. 
The main assumption of the Taylor rule is that output and inﬂ  ation are the main 
policy goals of the Fed. However, the Fed’s main policy goals are stable prices, 
maximum employment and moderate long-run interest rates, which should even-
tually lead to a stable output and growth levels. Up until the 1990s the levels of 
high employment were highly correlated with output growth, but in the recent 
recession employment levels started to lag behind economic recovery, hence the 
term “jobless growth”. The once interrelated Fed goals are now slightly detached 
as the Fed experiences political pressures if employment is not at its maximum 
level, even if output and inﬂ  ation are at their expected levels. The voters often see 
unemployment as the best yardstick to conclude whether the current government 
is doing a good job or not. This creates additional political pressure on the ruling 
party in Congress as they need to satisfy voters before the election making them 
10 John Taylor explains his rule in the following way: if inflation rises by 1% the proper answer would be a 
raise of the interest rate by 1.5%. This increase doesn’t always have to be 1.5% but it is crucial that it were 
above 1%. If the GDP would drop by 1% with respect to its potential growth level, then the right answer 




















































































































114 believe that they indeed can handle the economy. The Fed doesn’t answer to the 
public on how it is governing the monetary policy or whether it maintains a stable 
level of employment, but it does to the Congress. Thus Congress can create poli-
tical pressure on the Fed, despite the Fed’s huge independence, to focus on one 
goal in particular. 
FIGURE 8
Comparison of the federal funds rate determined by FOMC and the suggested 































Taylor rule interest rate Federal funds rate
Source: Federal Reserve Board, 2010 (appendix table A).
This may inﬂ  uence the justiﬁ  ability of using the Taylor rule in assessing monetary 
policy, as the employment level and the deviation from its potential level rather 
than output have to be taken into account while determining whether the Fed was 
making the right policy decisions or not. If the Fed was following the full employ-
ment level goal which caused it to alter its policy rates from the market determi-
ned ones, one could presume that this was due to political pressure. Due to the 
jobless recovery in the post-2001 recession the reason behind low policy rates 
could have been the fact that employment was not following the output growth. 
The Taylor rule suggested that output and inﬂ  ation were at stable levels and that 
there was no need for low interest rates (at least not for so long). From this pers-
pective the low rates might have been justiﬁ  ed. However, it remains a fact that low 
rates contributed to the expansion of the housing bubble. Therefore, although low 
rates had an effect on rising housing prices (as was seen in ﬁ  gure 6 in chapter 3.2) 
they cannot be construed as the only cause of the bubble bursting (as is also shown 
on ﬁ  gure 6). From this it can be inferred that the Fed did not have a crucial role in 
the crisis as its rates were justiﬁ  able at the time. Nonetheless the rates were low 



















































































































115 do with its rapid bursting and the fact that the demand on the housing market rose 
so rapidly. The cause of increasing demand lies in other areas of policy decision-
making, such as the ones already presented in this paper. 
6 POLITICAL POWER OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
With regulatory oversights a scene was set for even bigger investments into riskier 
deals, asset bubble inﬂ  ation and bursting. The process that preceded the crisis was 
the expansion of the ﬁ  nance industry and its lobbyist and political power in the 
80s and the 90s. 
The enormous wealth accumulated by the ﬁ  nancial sector gave the bankers great 
political power – the biggest since J.P. Morgan. During his time (1907) a banking 
panic could have been stopped only by a coordination of all the bankers in the 
private sector, because there wasn’t any government body strong enough to pro-
vide an effective solution. The age of banking oligarchs has been suspended by 
the establishment of various new regulatory measures following the Great De-
pression of 1933 (such as the Glass-Steagall Act). In the period between the 1980s 
and 2002 there was an increasing trend toward proﬁ  tability of the ﬁ  nancial sector 
whilst the real sector experienced a decrease of its proﬁ  ts in relation to GDP (ﬁ  gu-
re 9). In the years preceding the crisis the ﬁ  nancial sector growth was even more 
impulsive and due to rising amount of credit available in the system it is possible 
that the real sector growth in proﬁ  tability at the time was fuelled by the ﬁ  nancial 
sector growth. A trend in which there is a decrease of investment into the real 
sector as against an increase of investments into the ﬁ  nancial sector is known as a 
process of ﬁ  nancialization – a rise of the share of the ﬁ  nancial sector as part of the 
GDP. In the 1970s the ﬁ  nancial sector had a share in total US proﬁ  ts of around 
17%, in the 1990s this grew to in-between 21 and 30% whilst just before the Great 
Recession it reached a level of 41%. Parallel to this increase of the scope of the 
ﬁ  nancial sector there was a growing gap between the real economy and the total 
value of all ﬁ  nancial transactions concerning derivatives and other securities. This 
gap developed to a ratio of 1:4 in favour of the ﬁ  nancial industry (the World GDP 
being around 50 trillion dollars and the value of all ﬁ  nancial transactions reaching 




















































































































6.1 LOBBYING AND POLITICAL POWER
The US ﬁ  nancial industry gained more and more support and trust at the national 
level, which matched the support the real sector industries had had before. “Once 
what was good for General Motors was good for the country. Over the past deca-
de, the attitude took hold that what was good for Wall Street was good for the 
country” (Johnson, 2009). The bankers had gained political power due to their 
rising economic power and developed into much more than mere interest groups 
as their interests became identical with those of the government.
Simon Johnson draws attention to the ﬂ  ow of individuals between Wall Street and 
Washington that only emphasises the linkage between newly empowered bankers 
and the government. Robert Rubin, the co-chairman of Goldman Sachs was the 
Treasury Secretary in the Clinton administration and after his political career en-
ded up in Citigroup. Henry Paulson, the CEO of Goldman Sachs, was appointed 
the Treasury Secretary in the Bush administration. Paulson’s predecessor John 
Snow later became the chairman of a large private equity ﬁ  rm Cerberus Capital 
Management, while Alan Greenspan, a long-time Chairman of the Fed became a 
consultant in Pimco, one of the strongest international bond market companies. 
Such connections are even bigger at lower bureaucratic levels in the last three 
presidential administrations which have further increased the strong bonds 
between Washington and Wall Street. For Goldman Sachs employees it was al-
most a tradition to ﬁ  nd jobs in public services after they leave the ﬁ  rm, and vice 
versa – after a career in the public sector they were always welcome back to their 
position on Wall Street (Johnson, 2009). 
FIGURE 9
US private sector proﬁ  ts as share od GDP (%), annual
 Financial sector proﬁ  ts as share of GDP    Real sector proﬁ  ts as share of GDP
Source: Government Printing Office, 2010.


























































































































Source: Author’s own calculations (data – see table 4). 
Banks such as Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase or Bank of America spent a lot of 
money on lobbying activities so as to avoid bankruptcy and acquire additional 
beneﬁ  ts for further business activities (such as acquisitions of Bear Sterns and 
Washington Mutual by JP Morgan Chase or Merrill Lynch by Bank of America). 
Their lobbying activities did not allow the Lehman Brothers scenario. Although 
they were also companies full of “toxic” assets they ended up acquiring new
banks and expanding their business activity. The ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve banks by the size of 
assets are at the same time the ﬁ  ve banks with the most lobbying expenditures, 
taking into account the last 10 years as well as 2008 (table 4). In both cases the 
only one that stands out is AIG which has in the last 10 years, as well as in 2008, 
The system of power accumulated by the ﬁ  nancial institutions becomes more evi-
dent when looking at bailout funds and by what principles were they redistributed. 
According to ﬁ  gure 10 there is a correlation between the amount of bailout funds 
and the company’s lobbying expenditures and campaign donations. For example, 
although the bailout was supposed to be redistributed according to the size of as-
sets of a certain company it is clear that AIG, although not the biggest in the size 
of its assets got arguably the most money from the bailout. The reason for that 
could be the fact that AIG had the most lobbying expenditures in 2008 as well as 
throughout the decade. Perhaps allowing AIG to declare bankruptcy would have 
proven to be highly destabilizing for the ﬁ  nancial system, but it still doesn’t justify 
the disproportion in the bailout funds received by AIG and all other banks, where 
the bailout funds were approximately 8% of AIG asset values. No other bank re-
ceived bailout funds of more than 2.5% of its total assets (table 4). 
FIGURE 10
Bailout funds and lobbying expenditures in 2008























































































































































































118 spent the most money on lobbying. The lobbying policies of AIG correspond with 
its bailout funds. AIG was given two times more funds than any other ﬁ  nancial 
company. Lehman Brothers, the only big bank that was left to fail did not invest 
as much into lobbying and political campaigns as other ﬁ  nancial institutions that 
found themselves in similar problems11. 
TABLE 4
Bailout funds, total assets and lobbying and political campaign expenditures of 
































AIGd 85 1,022 8.32 9.57 0.33 90.9
Citigroupe 45 2,050 2.20 5.52 0.95 84.5
Bank of Americaf  45 1,817 2.48 4.10 2.66 26.7
JP Morgan Chase  25 2,251 1.11 5.46 0.80 52.8
Wells Fargo  25 1,371g 1.82h 2.27 1.10 15.5
Morgan Stanley  10 987 1.01 2.50 0.80 25.9
Goldman Sachs  10 1,082 0.92 3.39 0.94 19.8
Bank of New York   3 268 1.12 0.55 0.62   1.9
Lehman Brothers  -  691 - 0.60 0.55   8.6
a –   Bailout funds are taken as the amount of preferred stock purchases received through the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in 2008. JP Morgan, Wells Fargo, Morgan Stanley, 
Goldman Sachs and Bank of New York received funds only through the TARP. AIG, Citi and 
Bank of America had additional sources. 
Source: U. S. Department of the Treasury, 2008.
b –   Measured as total assets in 2008, i.e. at the time the bailouts were given. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board, 2010. 
c –   Source for lobbying expenditures and campaign donations (final three columns). 
Source: Center for responsive politics, 2010b.
d –   AIG was initially given $40 billion by the Treasury through the Systematically Significant 
Failing Institution Program. This was expanded by the $43.5 billion AIG got from the Federal 
Reserve Credit Facility (from which they are allowed to take up to $60 billion, reduced from 
the initially $85 billion) and a $1.5 billion from the Treasury credit line (from which they are 
11 Perhaps the fact that Lehman Brothers borrowed significant amounts to fund its investing into MBSs in the 
years preceding the crisis raising its leverage ratio to 30:1 (SEC, Lehman Annual Report, 2007) made it too 
vulnerable to the housing market downturn thus making it impossible for the government to bail them out. 
However, other big banks also found themselves in problems having their assets filled with MBSs, but were 
bailed out nonetheless. A broader analysis of each company’s exposure to bankruptcy risk is needed so as to 
make a stronger conclusion. The Treasury conducted a stress test in February 2009, almost 6 months after the 
Lehman bankruptcy to determine how much more money was needed to salvage the biggest bank holding 
companies. Maybe this test came too late for Lehman, but it would be interesting to view the results of furt-




















































































































allowed to take $30 billion). AIG received a further $49.5 billion later in 2009 through Federal 
Reserve Securities Purchases, but these weren’t taken into account as only the bailout funds 
resulting from lobbying expenditures in 2008 were considered, as well as bank assets.
Source: Federal Reserve Board, 2010.
e –   Citigroup received $25 billion through the TARP (more precisely through the Capital Purchase 
Program, CIP) in September 2008. It received an additional $20 billion on December 31st 
2008 as a part of the Targeted Investment Program (TIP). Both programs were governed by 
the US Treasury Department. 
f –   Bank of America received initially $15 billion through the TARP (i.e. through the CIP) in 
September 2008 followed by an additional $10 billion (again through the CEP) and $20 billi-
on through the TIP in January 2009. 
g –   Wells Fargo before the purchase of Wachovia (December 31st, 2008) had assets worth $662 
billion. 
h –   The share of bailouts in total assets would be 3.78%, if the original asset size of Wells Fargo 
before the purchase of Wachovia was taken into account. 
Wells Fargo is another example of buying political inﬂ  uence. Before the purchase 
of Wachovia Bank, the size of the Wells Fargo assets was approximately the same 
as that of Lehman Brothers. Nonetheless, Wells Fargo was given more than or the 
same amount of bailout money as much larger banks. However Wells Fargo’s 
clever investments in political campaigns during the crisis left them in an even 
better position than before. In 2008 this bank spent over a million dollars to ﬁ  nan-
ce Congressmen’s political campaigns12. In 2009 they spent 2.9 million dollars, 
while in 2010 the amount was 2.3 million dollars. As the purchase of Wachovia 
was closed on December 31st 2008, the further outﬂ  ow of funds is most likely an 
act of appreciation to the politicians that made this deal possible (Center for Re-
sponsive Politics, 2010). Due to the previously mentioned fact that the bailout 
funds were to be assigned by the TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) based on 
the size and value of a bank’s assets (the bigger the assets the bigger the bailout 
funds), 25 billion dollars for Wells Fargo in comparison to zero dollars for Leh-
man Brothers increases the possibility that non-economic and/or political criteria 
were determining the allocation of the bailout funds. A further examination of 
bankruptcy risk of both of these companies as well as the relative size of MBSs in 
total assets is needed so as to reach a complete conclusion as to how the bailout 
funds were allocated. 
The American ﬁ  nancial industry has shown substantial lobbyist power in the redi-
stribution of TARP funds and for now it is threatening to repel or distort any reco-
very act or ﬁ  scal stimulus as well as a ﬁ  nancial reform that doesn’t match its se-
lective criteria. The increased power of the ﬁ  nancial industry basically gives it a 
right of veto on public decision making, even in the times when they have lost 
public support. Simon Johnson emphasizes that in March 2009 a group of CEOs 
from the nation’s thirteen most prominent banking and ﬁ  nancial institutions met 
12 Among which the recipients were mostly the in-office Democrats holding key positions in the Congress. One 
example is the House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, a second in line of presidential succession, following Vice-presi-
dent Joe Biden. Another example is Democratic House Representative Carolyn Maloney, member of a series 
of Committees on Financial Services and Oversight and Government Reform as well as the Chairwomen of 



















































































































120 with President Obama in hopes to get the government on their side and insure 
even more of taxpayers’ money and government guarantees for themselves (John-
son and Kwak, 2010). It seems as though the banks accumulated even more poli-
tical power since the onset of the crisis, and power was generated from a built-in 
belief that further bankruptcies of large ﬁ  nancial institutions (Lehman was rather 
small compared to Bank of America, Citigroup or JP Morgan) would cause irre-
parable damage (bringing in the “too big to fail” concept). The banks are likely to 
use this fear to grasp even more taxpayer money and favourable contracts with 
Washington. For example, Bank of America received new bailout funds as soon 
as it declared that it would not be able to purchase Merrill Lynch. As soon as they 
were granted the funds (through TIP) the acquisition was possible. “Campaign 
contributions and the revolving door between the private sector and government 
service gave Wall Street banks inﬂ  uence in Washington, but their ultimate victory 
lay in shifting the conventional wisdom in their favour, to the point where their 
lobbyists’ talking points seemed self-evident to congressmen and administration 
ofﬁ  cials... In the aftermath of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, the banks could still roll out their 
conventional weaponry – campaign money and lobbyists; but because of their 
ideological power many of their battles were won in advance” (Johnson and 
Kwak, 2010). 
6.2 THE IMPLICATION OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON BAILOUTS 
Many voted in favour of the stimulus however, hoping that this would bring about 
to a more stable system returning to it its much needed conﬁ  dence. The bailouts 
combined with a ﬁ  scal stimulus have indeed provided the system with more con-
ﬁ  dence and were crucial in restoring the short-run stabilization and liquidity. In a 
system of rising systemic risk and lack of public conﬁ  dence towards the banks 
triggering a possible bank run and an even bigger loss of jobs and production, ﬁ  -
scal stimuli and bailouts could prove to be more than welcome. Deutsche Bank 
Research has pointed out that the costs (in terms of direct ﬁ  scal costs) of a large 
government intervention may turn out to be much smaller than anticipated and 
much smaller than in previous ﬁ  nancial crises. They estimate them to be only a 
small fraction of the GDP unlikely to exceed 2% even in countries most hit by the 
crisis (DB, 2010). Many others have also pointed out the beneﬁ  ts of bailouts and 
stimuli in a sense that the recession would have been much more severe and that 
unemployment would have reached even higher levels. The system, if it were left 
to self-correct would lead the entire world into a long lasting recession. The com-
parison was somewhat reminiscent of the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
The threat of a further stimulus to the banks which they would use to distort its 
effects still stands. Bailouts can prove to have huge indirect costs that transcend 
mere ﬁ  scal costs. Banks can very likely misuse them so as to make the system far 
more dependent on them than it already is. Also, little attention has been given to 
all those ﬁ  rms that did not receive any bailout funds at all. The stimulus package 



















































































































121 spending increase to fund social security or infrastructural programs beneﬁ  ts ei-
ther the public sector or the large companies who lobby their way into getting the 
job for a certain government-funded project. Through a stimulus plan “a large 
portion of the allocated funds will go to state governments, local governments and 
non-proﬁ  t organizations: entities that have no market-driven test of whether they 
are creating or destroying value via the rationalization of invested capital” (Grant, 
2009). The small and medium-sized businesses are left without stimulus resour-
ces. The result of a bailout or any kind of government favouritism of certain pri-
vate companies (that is always a result of that company’s high lobbying activity 
and/or political campaign ﬁ  nancing) is the shattering of the competition. If one 
company gets money from the government while its competition doesn’t, it has 
clear advantage over the others.
Small and medium sized businesses have often been recognized as the drivers of 
growth. Even when the data indicate that there are a lot of small businesses that 
fail every year, even more businesses survive and grow on a yearly basis as well. 
Entrepreneurs will continue to invest into various business projects until they ﬁ  nd 
a project that will result in success. This process of constant dynamics of entrepre-
neurship that eventually yields the best possible solution for them as well as for 
the entire economy is known as the process of creative destruction as deﬁ  ned by 
Schumpeter (1975). Shattering this process with favouritism of certain companies 
is not likely to be a way out of a recession. 
The bailouts, despite their short-run stabilization effect, complete the picture of a 
growing partnership between the largest ﬁ  nancial institutions and the government. 
The government stands to protect the institutions from failure as the stability of 
the system is far too dependent on them, thus increasing moral hazard and encou-
raging lack of responsibility. Such actions by the government will certainly not 
decrease the accumulated power of the ﬁ  nancial industry. It is more likely that 
they will enhance it, creating conditions for further instability and dependence of 
the ﬁ  nance industry on the government. In the light of what this paper has presen-
ted so far, this can only result in yet another ﬁ  nancial crisis in which the decisions 
of the banks will again be steered by regulatory policies and credible promises of 
future bailouts thus furthering the moral hazard problem and creating a new asset 
bubble and a new dose of uncertainty and instability. 
7 CONCLUSION
The very existence of a recession does not justify the enormous subsidies to va-
rious ﬁ  nancial institutions nor does it justify the increasing spread of government 
intervention all over the ﬁ  nancial markets. Although some of the biggest ﬁ  nancial 
institutions were close to bankruptcy, overall the data at the time were not sugge-
stive of a worldwide crisis, rather of a process of creative destruction – the driving 
force of capitalism. These ﬁ  nancial giants do not leave a black hole in the credit 
market; rather they are being quickly replaced by other, smaller and healthier 



















































































































122 The political power of government institutions and its connection with the corpo-
rate world of ﬁ  nance generated the current ﬁ  nancial crisis. The government was 
involved through a series of impulses through which it guided the behaviour of 
businesses. The ﬁ  nancial industry on the other hand created the dependency of the 
system on them resulting in rising cohesion with government ofﬁ  cials. This crea-
ted a system in which the banks acquired political protection resulting in a rising 
moral hazard problem where systemic risk was thus increasing. The regulators 
encouraged the banks to invest into non-standard home loans thus contributing to 
the growth of the housing bubble. Through an expansive monetary policy further 
impulses were created and liquidity was drawn into the asset market contributing 
to housing and securities bubbles. Through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac the re-
gulators were reaching the HUD’s housing objectives thus contributing to the 
creation of adverse selection. The increase of MBSs in banks’ balances because 
the required capital standards had been reached was yet another effect of mispla-
ced regulatory decisions. Finally, the government failures will be paid for by the 
taxpayers. If the taxpayers or better yet the voters were able to learn an important 
lesson from this it would present a substantial limitation to further misconduct of 
political institutions. 
This crisis does not present a failure of capitalism because the success of capitali-
sm is not based on unregulated markets. It is based on free markets. Economic 
growth and wealth accumulation are highly correlated with market freedoms. The 
crisis therefore doesn’t present a failure of capitalism or free markets but the fai-
lure of overregulated markets, or better yet markets regulated by narrow interest 
groups with a substantial level of political power. 
The biggest risk that could occur as an outcome of the crisis is the possibility that 
even more politicians, economists and the public in general start to believe that the 
free market is to be blamed for causing the crisis, diverting thus the public opinion 
against the market economy. This would result in not only a decrease of economic 
freedom and economic growth but also an endangerment of the fundamental prin-

















































































































































2000/1 2 3.8 0.5 -1.8 0.5 2.9 6.35 5.85
2000/2 2 3.7 0.5 -1.7 0.5 4.0 6.85 6.53
2000/3 2 3.5 0.5 -1.5 0.5 3.2 6.35 6.52
2000/4 2 3.4 0.5 -1.4 0.5 3.0 6.20 6.40
2001/1 2 2.9 0.5 -0.9 0.5 1.6 5.25 5.31
2001/2 2 3.2 0.5 -1.2 0.5 1.5 5.35 3.97
2001/3 2 2.6 0.5 -0.6 0.5 0.0 4.31 3.07
2001/4 2 1.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 -0.7 3.45 1.82
2002/1 2 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.6 3.45 1.82
2002/2 2 1.1 0.5 0.9 0.5 -1.0 3.07 1.75
2002/3 2 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 -1.1 3.20 1.75
2002/4 2 2.4 0.5 -0.4 0.5 -1.8 3.30 1.24
2003/1 2 3.0 0.5 -1.0 0.5 -2.2 3.40 1.25
2003/2 2 2.1 0.5 -0.1 0.5 -2.0 3.05 1.22
2003/3 2 2.3 0.5 -0.3 0.5 -1.0 3.65 1.01
2003/4 2 1.9 0.5 0.1 0.5 -0.8 3.55 1.00
2004/1 2 1.7 0.5 0.3 0.5 -0.7 3.52 1.00
2004/2 2 3.3 0.5 -1.3 0.5 -0.7 4.31 1.00
2004/3 2 2.5 0.5 -0.5 0.5 -0.4 4.07 1.61
2004/4 2 3.3 0.5 -1.3 0.5 0.0 4.65 2.16
2005/1 2 3.1 0.5 -1.1 0.5 0.6 4.85 2.63
2005/2 2 2.5 0.5 -0.5 0.5 0.6 4.55 3.00
2005/3 2 4.7 0.5 -2.7 0.5 1.2 5.95 3.62














































































































































2006/1 2 3.4 0.5 -1.4 0.5 2.2 5.80 4.59
2006/2 2 4.3 0.5 -2.3 0.5 2.2 6.25 4.99
2006/3 2 2.1 0.5 -0.1 0.5 1.9 4.99 5.25
2006/4 2 2.5 0.5 -0.5 0.5 1.8 5.17 5.25
2007/1 2 2.8 0.5 -0.8 0.5 1.9 5.33 5.25
2007/2 2 2.7 0.5 -0.7 0.5 2.1 5.42 5.25
2007/3 2 2.8 0.5 -0.8 0.5 2.2 5.51 4.94
2007/4 2 4.1 0.5 -2.1 0.5 2.6 6.30 4.24
2008/1 2 4.0 0.5 -2.0 0.5 2.0 6.00 2.61
2008/2 2 5.0 0.5 -3.0 0.5 2.2 6.60 2.00
2008/3 2 4.9 0.5 -2.9 0.5 -0.2 5.30 1.81
2008/4 2 1.1 0.5 0.9 0.5 -2.0 2.50 0.16
2009/1 2 -0.4 0.5 2.4 0.5 -4.0 0.80 0.16
2009/2 2 -1.4 0.5 3.4 0.5 -6.4 -0.90 0.25
2009/3 2 -1.3 0.5 3.3 0.5 -6.9 -1.10 0.15
2009/4 2 2.0 0.5 0 0.5 -6.0 1.00 0.12
a – Long-run interest rate estimated by John Taylor to be 2% (Taylor, 1993).
b –   Measured as the headline CPI inflation (Federal Reserve Board, 2010).
c –   Inflation gap determined by the difference between real inflation and its target level of 2% as 
set by the Federal Reserve Board.
d –   Output gap as determined by the difference between real and potential output. According to Taylor 
(1993) this is calculated as:  . Real output data available at Economic Report of the 
President: 2010 [online] www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/tables10.html. Potential output data available: 
Government Printing Office, 2010; and potential output data available at Congressional Budget 
Office, 2001. 
e – Suggested Taylor rule interest rate;  .
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